000			06312cam a2200613Ii 4500
001			ocn975486958
003			OCoLC
005			20241121072647.0
006			m d
007			cr cnu|||unuuu
008			170314s2017 enk ob 001 0 eng d
040			_aN$T _beng _erda _epn _cN$T _dN$T _dEBLCP _dYDX _dOCLCF _dUKOUP _dUBY _dCSAIL _dOH1
019			_a975990799 _a976136124 _a976237540 _a978479240 _a978784140 _a979068261 _a979389142 _a979436645
020			_a9780191089039 _q(electronic bk.)
020			_a0191089036 _q(electronic bk.)
020			_z9780198785934
035			_a1484901 _b(N$T)
035			_a(OCoLC)975486958 _z(OCoLC)975990799 _z(OCoLC)976136124 _z(OCoLC)976237540 _z(OCoLC)978479240 _z(OCoLC)978784140 _z(OCoLC)979068261 _z(OCoLC)979389142 _z(OCoLC)979436645
050		4	_aBF442 _b.S64 2017
072		7	_aPHI _x011000 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a153.4/3 _223
049			_aMAIN
100	1		_aSnedegar, Justin, _eauthor. _98353
245	1	0	_aContrastive reasons / _cJustin Snedegar.
250			_aFirst edition.
264		1	_aOxford, United Kingdom : _bOxford University Press, _c2017.
300			_a1 online resource (xi, 149 pages)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
588	0		_aOnline resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed March 17, 2017).
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
520			_aJustin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Work on reasons has become central to several areas of philosophy, but besides a couple of exceptions, this view has not been discussed. Contrastive Reasons makes the case that this is a mistake. Snedegar develops three kinds of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism gives us the best account of our ordinary discourse about reasons. Second, contrastivism best makes sense of widespread ideas about what reasons are, including the idea that they favor the things they are reasons for and the idea that they involve the promotion of certain kinds of objectives. Third, contrastivism has attractive applications in different areas of normative philosophy in which reasons are important. These include debates in normative ethics about whether better than might be intransitive and debates in both epistemology and practical reasoning about the rationality of withholding or suspending belief and intention.
505	0		_aCover; Contrastive Reasons; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; Preface; 1: Contrastivism and Reasons; 1.1 Reasons and Contrastivism; 1.1.1 Reasons; 1.1.2 Contrastivism; 1.2 Reasons and the Contrastivist Program; 1.2.1 Reasons and justification; 1.2.2 Reasons and 'ought'; 1.2.3 Reasons and explanation; 1.3 The Plan; 2: Reason Claims; 2.1 A Simple Argument; 2.2 A Stronger Argument; 2.2.1 The argument; 2.2.2 Response: denying exclusivity; 2.3 Contrastivism; 2.3.1 A contrastive account of reason claims; 2.3.2 A contrastive solution; 2.4 Other 'Rather than' Ascriptions
505	8		_a2.5 Negative Reason Existentials2.5.1 The puzzle; 2.5.2 The pragmatic solution; 2.5.3 A contrastivist solution; 2.6 Looking Forward; 3: Favoring; 3.1 Why Resist Contrastivism?; 3.2 Shallow Contrastivism; 3.2.1 A traditional theory of favoring; 3.2.2 A contrastive account of reason claims; 3.2.3 Shallow contrastivism and exclusivity; 3.3 Favoring; 3.3.1 Against non-contrastive favoring; 3.4 Contrastive Reasons and Favoring; 3.4.1 Contrastivism; 3.4.2 A problem; 3.4.3 Reasons and ought; 3.5 Looking Forward; 4: Promotion; 4.1 The Need for Constraints; 4.1.1 Intransitivity
505	8		_a4.1.2 Reasons for and subsets4.1.3 Reasons against and supersets; 4.1.4 Entailment relations and deliberation; 4.2 Promotion; 4.2.1 Promotion in the theory of reasons; 4.2.2 Doing nothing; 4.2.3 Not A-ing; 4.2.4 Contrastive promotion; 4.2.5 Motivating resolution sensitivity; 4.3 Contrastive Reasons and Promotion; 4.4 Contrastive Reasons as Better Reasons?; 4.5 Providing the Constraints; 4.5.1 Transitivity; 4.5.2 Non-exhaustivity; 4.5.3 Resolution sensitivity; 4.5.4 Other entailments: Unions and intersections; 4.6 Non-Promotional Reasons; 4.7 Where we Are; 5: Intransitivity
505	8		_a5.1 Transitivity and Reasons5.2 Intransitivity; 5.2.1 The Repugnant Conclusion; 5.2.2 Resisting the first step; 5.2.3 The Mere Addition Paradox; 5.3 Intransitivity and Contrastivism; 5.3.1 Two kinds of intransitivity; 5.4 Contrast-Sensitive Importance; 5.4.1 Strength of reasons and importance of objectives; 5.4.2 Contrast-sensitive importance; 5.4.3 Contrastivism about reasons and importance; 5.5 Remaining Questions; 5.5.1 What should I do?; 5.5.2 Why so uncommon?; 5.6 Conclusion; 6: Withholding; 6.1 Withholding Belief and Contrastive Reasons; 6.1.1 Contrastive epistemic reasons
505	8		_a6.1.2 A contrastive account of rational withholding6.1.3 A non-contrastive account; 6.1.4 Ties; 6.1.5 A contrastivist explanation; 6.1.6 Reasons not to withhold belief?; 6.2 Withholding Intention; 6.2.1 A unified account?; 6.2.2 Contrastive practical reasons; 6.2.3 A contrastive account of rational withholding of intention; 6.2.4 A unified account; 6.3 Wrap Up; References; Index
590			_aMaster record variable field(s) change: 050, 082, 650
650		0	_aReasoning. _98354
650		0	_aContrast (Philosophy) _98355
650		0	_aNormativity (Ethics) _98356
650		7	_aPHILOSOPHY / Logic _2bisacsh _98357
650		7	_aReason. _2fast _0(OCoLC)fst01091272 _98358
655		4	_aElectronic books. _93907
776	0	8	_iPrint version : _tContrastive reasons. _z9780198785934 _w(OCoLC)965764050
856	4	0	_3EBSCOhost _uhttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1484901
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