Contemporary debates in epistemology
Contemporary debates in epistemology
Edited by Roeber Blake, Sosa Ernest, Steup Matthias & Turri, John
- Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, 2024.
- xxiii, 360 p.: 26cm
Includes indexes and references
1 Does knowledge come first in epistemology? Knowledge comes first / Mona Simion
Known unknowns and the limits of knowledge / Aidan McGlynn
Knowledge still comes first / Mona Simion
Circumstantial luck and knowledge-first epistemology / Aidan McGlynn
2 Does justification supervene on the internal? Is justification just in the head? / Clayton Littlejohn
The possibility of internalist epistemology / Kurt L. Sylvan
3 Is suspension of judgment a question-directed attitude? Is suspension of judgment a question-directed attitude? No, not really / Matthew McGrath
Suspension of judgment is a question-directed attitude / Jane Friedman
4 Are There Practical Reasons for Belief? There are practical reasons for belief / Susanna Rinard
There are no practical reasons for belief / Thomas Kelly and Stewart Cohen
Reply to and Kelly and Cohen / Susanna Rinard
5 Is evidence permissive? Introductions and stage-setting / Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci
A permissive notion of rationality / Miriam Schoenfield
We are not mushy permissivists and, moreover, we should not be / Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci
Is the disagreement between us substantive? / Miriam Schoenfield
A final plea for impermissivism / Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci
Some Final Thoughts / Miriam Schoenfield
Permissivism and metaepistemology / Sophie Horowitz, Sinan Dogramaci, and Miriam Schoenfield
6 Does fundamental evidence consist in seemings? Evidence Is seemings / Michael Huemer
Evidence is not seemings / Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
Four challenges for phenomenal conservatism / Michael Huemer
Preservative memory and trouble for internalism / Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
7 Does knowledge exclude luck? Knowing can include luck / Stephen Hetherington
There cannot be lucky knowledge / Duncan Pritchard
On whether knowing can include luck: asking the correct question / Stephen Hetherington
Reply to Hetherington / Duncan Pritchard
8 Is the a priori/a posteriori distinction important for epistemology? Is the a priori/a posteriori distinction superficial? / Timothy Williamson
The significance of a priori justification / Paul Boghossian
Response to Boghossian / Timothy Williamson
Reply to Williamson / Paul Boghossian
9 How should we use thought experiments in epistemology? How to use thought experiments / Elijah Chudnoff
A guide to thought experiments in epistemology / Wesley Buckwalter
How to think about how to use thought experiments / Elijah Chudnoff
Thinking about using thought experiments: further questions / Wesley Buckwalter
10 Is belief a species of credence? Credences are degrees of belief / Roger Clarke
Is belief credence 1? Depends on what you mean! / Julia Staffel
Two in the model, one in the head / Roger Clarke
11 Is epistemic normativity instrumental? Epistemic normativity is independent of our goals / Alex Worsnip
Epistemic normativity is not independent of our goals / J. Adam Carter
A brief reply to Carter / Alex Worsnip
12 Is testimony a basic source of justification? A defense of local reductionism about testimony / Elizabeth Fricker
Anti- reductionism in the epistemology of testimony / Sanford C. Goldberg
Comments on Sanford Goldberg’s “Anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony” / Elizabeth Fricker
Comments on Elizabeth Fricker’s “A defense of local reductionism about testimony” / Sanford C. Goldberg
13 Does common sense conflict with skepticism? Skepticism Is common sense / Allan Hazlett
Skepticism is not common sense / Krista Lawlor
Reply to Lawlor / Allan Hazlett
Reply to Hazlett / Krista Lawlor
14 Is knowledge the norm of assertion? Knowledge is the norm of assertion / Matthew A. Benton
Knowledge is not our norm of assertion / Peter J. Graham and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen
9781119755449
BD 161 / .R64 2024
Includes indexes and references
1 Does knowledge come first in epistemology? Knowledge comes first / Mona Simion
Known unknowns and the limits of knowledge / Aidan McGlynn
Knowledge still comes first / Mona Simion
Circumstantial luck and knowledge-first epistemology / Aidan McGlynn
2 Does justification supervene on the internal? Is justification just in the head? / Clayton Littlejohn
The possibility of internalist epistemology / Kurt L. Sylvan
3 Is suspension of judgment a question-directed attitude? Is suspension of judgment a question-directed attitude? No, not really / Matthew McGrath
Suspension of judgment is a question-directed attitude / Jane Friedman
4 Are There Practical Reasons for Belief? There are practical reasons for belief / Susanna Rinard
There are no practical reasons for belief / Thomas Kelly and Stewart Cohen
Reply to and Kelly and Cohen / Susanna Rinard
5 Is evidence permissive? Introductions and stage-setting / Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci
A permissive notion of rationality / Miriam Schoenfield
We are not mushy permissivists and, moreover, we should not be / Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci
Is the disagreement between us substantive? / Miriam Schoenfield
A final plea for impermissivism / Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci
Some Final Thoughts / Miriam Schoenfield
Permissivism and metaepistemology / Sophie Horowitz, Sinan Dogramaci, and Miriam Schoenfield
6 Does fundamental evidence consist in seemings? Evidence Is seemings / Michael Huemer
Evidence is not seemings / Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
Four challenges for phenomenal conservatism / Michael Huemer
Preservative memory and trouble for internalism / Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
7 Does knowledge exclude luck? Knowing can include luck / Stephen Hetherington
There cannot be lucky knowledge / Duncan Pritchard
On whether knowing can include luck: asking the correct question / Stephen Hetherington
Reply to Hetherington / Duncan Pritchard
8 Is the a priori/a posteriori distinction important for epistemology? Is the a priori/a posteriori distinction superficial? / Timothy Williamson
The significance of a priori justification / Paul Boghossian
Response to Boghossian / Timothy Williamson
Reply to Williamson / Paul Boghossian
9 How should we use thought experiments in epistemology? How to use thought experiments / Elijah Chudnoff
A guide to thought experiments in epistemology / Wesley Buckwalter
How to think about how to use thought experiments / Elijah Chudnoff
Thinking about using thought experiments: further questions / Wesley Buckwalter
10 Is belief a species of credence? Credences are degrees of belief / Roger Clarke
Is belief credence 1? Depends on what you mean! / Julia Staffel
Two in the model, one in the head / Roger Clarke
11 Is epistemic normativity instrumental? Epistemic normativity is independent of our goals / Alex Worsnip
Epistemic normativity is not independent of our goals / J. Adam Carter
A brief reply to Carter / Alex Worsnip
12 Is testimony a basic source of justification? A defense of local reductionism about testimony / Elizabeth Fricker
Anti- reductionism in the epistemology of testimony / Sanford C. Goldberg
Comments on Sanford Goldberg’s “Anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony” / Elizabeth Fricker
Comments on Elizabeth Fricker’s “A defense of local reductionism about testimony” / Sanford C. Goldberg
13 Does common sense conflict with skepticism? Skepticism Is common sense / Allan Hazlett
Skepticism is not common sense / Krista Lawlor
Reply to Lawlor / Allan Hazlett
Reply to Hazlett / Krista Lawlor
14 Is knowledge the norm of assertion? Knowledge is the norm of assertion / Matthew A. Benton
Knowledge is not our norm of assertion / Peter J. Graham and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen
9781119755449
BD 161 / .R64 2024