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019 _a957616553
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020 _a9780191086557
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020 _z9780198783947
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035 _a(OCoLC)962305667
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082 0 4 _a190
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049 _aMAIN
100 1 _aSch�onbaumsfeld, Genia.
_98084
245 1 4 _aThe illusion of doubt /
_cgenia Sch�onbaumsfeld.
264 1 _aOxford :
_bOxford University Press (GBP)
_c2016.
300 _a1 online resource (192 pages)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
520 8 _aThe Illusion of Doubt' shows that radical scepticism is an illusion generated by a Cartesian picture of our evidential situation - the view that my epistemic grounds in both the 'good' and the 'bad' cases must be the same, and consists in information about an inner mental realm of experience from which I must try to work my way out to what goes on 'out there' in the external world. It is this picture which issues both a standing invitation to radical scepticism and ensures that there is no way of getting out of it while agreeing to the sceptic's terms. What we therefore need to do is not try to answer the sceptical problem 'directly', but rather to undermine the assumptions that it depends on. These are among the most ingrained in contemporary epistemology. They include the notion that radical scepticism can be motivated by the 'closure' principle for knowledge, that the 'Indistinguishability Argument' renders the Cartesian conception compulsory, that the 'new evil genius thesis' is coherent, and the demand for a 'global validation' of our epistemic practices makes sense. Once these dogmas are undermined, the path is clear for a 'realism without empiricism' that allows us to re-establish unmediated contact with the objects and persons in our environment which an illusion of doubt had threatened to put forever beyond our cognitive grasp.
588 0 _aPrint version record.
505 0 _aCover ; The Illusion of Doubt; Copyright ; Dedication ; Contents; Acknowledgements; Epigraph ; Introduction: Dissolution, not Refutation; 1: The 'Default View' of Perceptual Reasons and 'Closure-Based' Sceptical Arguments; I Introduction; II Dretske's Case against Closure; III The Case Against Dretske; IV Scepticism and the 'Default View'; V Some Objections; VI Conclusion; 2: Forms of 'Envatment': 'Local' and 'Global'; I Introduction; II 'Local' Sceptical Scenarios and Arguments from (Perceptual) Illusion; III 'Global' Sceptical Scenarios and the 'Veil of Appearances' Sceptical Argument
505 8 _aIV 'Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism'V Closure Again; VI Conclusion; 3: Radical Scepticism and 'Private' Language; I Introduction; II The Private Inner Object Picture; III Private Ostensive Definition and Rule-Following; IV 'Memory Sceptical' Readings of PI 258; V The Myth of the Given; VI Implications for Radical Scepticism; VII Some Objections; VIII Conclusion; 4: The Incoherence of Global Validation; I Introduction; II 'Hinge Propositions' and the 'Logical' Exclusion of Doubt; III 'Logical Pragmatism'; IV Transmission and Closure Revisited; V Conclusion; 5: Realism without Empiricism
505 8 _aI IntroductionII No 'Hyper-Realism'; III Alternative Epistemic Systems and the Strange 'Wood-Sellers'; IV 'Absolute' Epistemic Facts and Epistemic Relativism; V Conclusion; Conclusion: The End of a Scandal; References; Index
590 _aMaster record variable field(s) change: 650
650 7 _aPHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / General
_2bisacsh
_98085
650 7 _aPHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Modern
_2bisacsh
_98086
650 0 _aBelief and doubt.
_98087
655 4 _aElectronic books.
_93907
655 0 _aElectronic books.
_93907
776 0 8 _iPrint version:
_aSch�onbaumsfeld, Genia.
_tIllusion of doubt.
_dOxford : Oxford University Press (GBP) 2016
_z9780198783947
_w(OCoLC)952182507
856 4 0 _3EBSCOhost
_uhttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1410045
938 _aOxford University Press USA
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938 _aEBSCOhost
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938 _aYBP Library Services
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