000 06675cam a2200625Mi 4500
001 on1038483164
003 OCoLC
005 20241121072713.0
006 m d
007 cr cnu---unuuu
008 180602s2018 enk o 000 0 eng d
040 _aEBLCP
_beng
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019 _a1038481693
_a1038594838
_a1039054462
_a1046449161
020 _a9780192546746
_q(electronic bk.)
020 _a0192546740
_q(electronic bk.)
020 _z0198815093
020 _z9780198815099
020 _z9780191852916
020 _z0191852910
035 _a1815776
_b(N$T)
035 _a(OCoLC)1038483164
_z(OCoLC)1038481693
_z(OCoLC)1038594838
_z(OCoLC)1039054462
_z(OCoLC)1046449161
050 4 _aB833
_b.L67 2018
050 4 _aBC177
072 7 _aPHI
_x010000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a128.33
049 _aMAIN
100 1 _aLord, Errol,
_eauthor.
_99792
245 1 4 _aThe importance of being rational /
_cErrol Lord.
264 1 _aOxford, United Kingdom :
_bOxford University Press,
_c2018.
300 _a1 online resource (xv, 261 pages)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
500 _aDescription based upon print version of record.
505 0 _aCover; The Importance of Being Rational; Copyright; Dedication; Preface; Contents; PART I: Initial Motivations; 1: Introduction: Reasons Responsiveness, the Reasons Program, and Knowledge-First; 1.1 An Ideological Primer; 1.1.1 Rationality, what; 1.1.2 Reasons Responsiveness as a real definition; 1.1.3 Objective normative reasons,what; 1.1.4 Possessed normative reasons, what; 1.1.5 Correctly responding to possessed normative reasons, what; 1.1.6 The requirements of rationality; 1.2 The Reasons Program and Knowledge-First; 1.2.1 The Reasons Program; 1.2.2 Knowledge-first; 1.3 The Plan
505 8 _a2: The Coherent and the Rational2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Debate as it Currently Stands; 2.3 Broome's Challenge; 2.4 What about Coherence?; 2.4.1 Closure; 2.4.2 Narrowly inconsistent intentions; 2.4.3 Broadly inconsistent intentions; 2.4.4 Means-end incoherence; 2.4.5 Akrasia; 2.5 Practical Condition Failures, High-Order Defeat, and Rational Incoherence; 2.5.1 Practical condition failures; 2.5.2 Higher-order defeat; 2.6 The Myth of the Coherent; 2.7 Back to the Beginning; PART II: Possessing Reasons; Summary of Part I and Introduction to Part II
505 8 _a3: What it is to Possess a Reason: The Epistemic Condition3.1 Introduction; 3.2 A Taxonomy; 3.3 Against Holding Views; 3.4 Against Low Bar Views; 3.5 Against Non-Factive Views; 3.5.1 For (2); 3.5.2 Back to (1); 3.6 Against P TEAR; 3.7 Conclusion; 4: What it is to Possess a Reason: The Practical Condition; 4.1 The Insufficiency of the Epistemic Condition; 4.2 The Counterexamples: A Diagnosis of What's GoingWrong; 4.3 Filling the Gap; 4.3.1 First attempt: missing beliefs(ish); 4.3.2 Second attempt: attitudinal orientation towards the right and good; 4.4 The Practical Condition and Know-How
505 8 _a4.4.1 Inferring desires from knowledge4.4.2 Generalizing; 4.5 Is Possession Composite?; PART III: Correctly Responding to Reasons; Summary of Part II and Introduction to Part III; 5: What it is to Correctly Respond to Reasons; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Acting for Motivating Reasons, Believing for Motivating Reasons, and Being Deviant; 5.3 Reacting for Normative Reasons; 5.4 Reacting for Normative Reasons, Essentially Normative Dispositions, and Know-How; 5.4.1 Essentially normative dispositions and deviancy; 5.4.2 Essentially normative dispositions and know-how
505 8 _a5.4.3 Why this is, alas, not enough to get all that we want5.5 Further Upshots; 5.5.1 The relationship between ex post and ex ante rationality; 5.5.2 Speckled hens and the epistemology of perception; 5.5.3 The causal efficacy of the normative; 5.6 Conclusion; 6: Achievements and Intelligibility: For Disjunctivism about Reacting for Reasons; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Reacting for Motivating Reasons and Reacting for Normative Reasons; 6.2.1 Reacting for motivating reasons; 6.2.2 Reacting for normative reasons; 6.3 The Univocal View and the Argument from Illusion; 6.4 Against the Univocal View
500 _a6.4.1 Part I: against the Normative Reasons-First view
520 _a"The Importance of Being Rational systematically defends a novel reasons-based account of rationality. The book's central thesis is that what it is for one to be rational is to correctly respond to the normative reasons one possesses. Errol Lord defends novel views about what it is to possess reasons and what it is to correctly respond to reasons. He shows that these views not only help to support the book's main thesis, they also help to resolve several important problems that are independent of rationality. The account of possession provides novel contributions to debates about what determines what we ought to do, and the account of correctly responding to reasons provides novel contributions to debates about causal theories of reacting for reasons. After defending views about possession and correctly responding, Lord shows that the account of rationality can solve two difficult problems about rationality. The first is the New Evil Demon problem. The book argues that the account has the resources to show that internal duplicates necessarily have the same rational status. The second problem concerns the deontic significance of rationality. Recently it has been doubted whether we ought to be rational. The ultimate conclusion of the book is that the requirements of rationality are the requirements that we ultimately ought to comply with. If this is right, then rationality is of fundamental importance to our deliberative lives." --
_cPublisher's website.
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references (pages {243]-253) and index.
590 _aMaster record variable field(s) change: 050
650 0 _aRationalism.
_99793
650 7 _aRationalism.
_2fast
_0(OCoLC)fst01090275
_99793
650 7 _aPHILOSOPHY / Movements / Humanism
_2bisacsh
_99794
655 4 _aElectronic books.
_93907
776 0 8 _iPrint version:
_aLord, Errol
_tImportance of being rational
_dOxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2018.
_z9780198815099
_w(OCoLC)1013965812
856 4 0 _3EBSCOhost
_uhttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1815776
938 _aEBL - Ebook Library
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938 _aYBP Library Services
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938 _aOxford University Press USA
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938 _aEBSCOhost
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